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instead of reducing diversity to unity, the book as a whole leads us to realize that where we suspected nothing but monotony and paucity of thought and observation there is in reality surprising diversity, independence of judgment and at least relative sharpness of vision. A word of admonition to the reader, however, seems called for. It is Nature in MHG lyrics that is presented here, not nature as seen by any one poet, or even by the average poet. A similar study in modern lyric poetry would also, of course, show a wealth of observation greater than could be found in the works of any one individual, and greater also than we probably now suspect. If one insists, therefore, upon comparing the poets of the 13th century with those of the 19th and 20th, one must wait until the complete data for the latter lie before him. Misprints occur here and there throughout the book but are not so serious as to mar the generally attractive appearance of the page. Most of them have been detected in time to be entered in a list of Errata, printed on Page VIII. I subjoin a few others which have escaped notice:

- p. 63, l. 25, *for* attracts *read* attracts.
- p. 64, l. 28, *for* assosiations *read* associations.
- p. 71, l. 8, *for* radiate *read* radiates.
- p. 74, l. 9, *for* wan *read* man.
- p. 84, l. 19, *for* stein *read* stone.
- p. 109, l. 22, *for* sing *read* sings.
- p. 121, l. 15, *for* unusally *read* unusually.

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FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHES Werke: Gross 8° Gesamt-Ausgabe. Bd. XIX. Philologica Bd. iii. Unveröffentlichtes zur antiken Religion und Philosophie. Herausgegeben von O. Crusius und W. Nestle. Leipzig, Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1913. Pp. 462. Brosch. M. 10; geb. M. 12.

The speed with which this, the final volume of the Philologica, follows upon the other two, and the high standard of scientific workmanship maintained throughout are cause for congratulation to both editors and publishers. A trying task has been completed in a manner which cannot fail to satisfy the demands of scholarship any less than those of literature. Otto Crusius, the editor of the second volume, has prepared the text of the lectures on the *Gottesdienst der Griechen*, together with the critical and explanatory notes thereon in the appendix, while W. Nestle has done the same for the series of lectures and studies in Greek philosophy, and added an index

to the three volumes of the philological section of Nietzsche's works (pp. 425-462), which is characteristic of his exact scholarship.

The most carefully elaborated perhaps of all Nietzsche's university lectures are those upon the *Gottesdienst der Griechen*, and the introduction to them is very properly given here in its complete form for its characteristically philosophic outlook on Greek religion. Interested however as he was in this topic and carefully as his work was done, he is nevertheless so obviously dependent upon others, that the general effect is a depersonalization of treatment which for Nietzsche is almost uncanny. The lectures are in fact little more than a reflection in the mirror of his brilliant style of views widely accepted in his day. The romantic elements in Curtius' studies on the Sacred Ways, and a picturesque fancy like Nissen's that the *templum* must have originated in the Po valley, in which the tributaries north and south formed the *cardines* and the Po itself the *decumanus maximus*, strongly impressed him. Even when he ventures a theory of his own, his fancy is prone to give mere common sense and scientific method the slip. Peculiarly infelicitous are the suggestions that the goddesses of night and of oil were in Attica identified because of an association in ideas between the moon and an olive oil lamp (p. 5 f.), and that the egg was used in temple purification because a rotten egg smells somewhat like sulphur (p. 113). Movers, Brandeis and Olshausen were leaders, to his confusion, in things Semitic. Nietzsche accepted readily each newest vagary propounded by the leading exponents of the particular phase of *le mirage oriental* then current. Whole groups of Hellenic gods, cults, myths, sagas, arts, industries and institutions are fathered upon the Semites; Hellenic science is out and out Egyptian, and even the most fundamental order of the social life of Hellas, the *polis*, is listed as a Phoenician importation.

We here see the genesis of that notion, which is constantly cropping out in Nietzsche's works, that the Hellenes were dependent upon Asia for their philosophic and religious thought. It forced, or rather *enabled* him to interpret all the higher life of Hellas in terms of Oriental mysticism and excess, throwing thereby every element of Hellenic culture into false perspective. His psychological studies of the Greek genius were thus irreparably vitiated by this *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of a romantic quasi-science. The effect was immediate and far-reaching. As the Greeks were Nietzsche's culture-ideal, the misconception of that ideal vitiated the very essence of his social philosophy. That Nietzsche would not have become the great pessimistic instinctivist without having thus misunder-

stood the Hellenic character can hardly be affirmed, for, to use that phrase of Pindar which was often on his lips, he could not have helped becoming what he was; but it is inconceivable that he should have grown prophet, fanatic, finally madman out of the sheer intensity of his conviction, had he not, even when deserted by his dearest friends, been exalted by the thought that he alone represented those mighty ideals of Hellenic culture before which he never ceased to worship. Historical criticism and methodology which Nietzsche scorned have here worked bitter revenge in condemning to unserviceableness much of his historical valuation of the Greek genius. A false perspective threw everything into impossible relations, and the vehemence of his thought served but to increase the distortions. It was indeed a great defect in Nietzsche's intellectual training that he was never thoroughly conversant with historical criticism, sociological and economic thought, the sciences, or, with what for many of the great Greek philosophers was an excellent substitute for these things, the world of affairs. He set out to solve the most difficult problems of the origins of moral concepts and social institutions equipped only with the tools of an elaborated verbal philology, philosophical speculation, and a series of unsystematic observations in applied psychology. Trenchant and cunning in his hands as these tools may have been, they are a hopelessly inadequate equipment wherewith to disclose the totality of human experience.

It is interesting to observe in these lectures that Nietzsche was among the very first of German classical philologists to notice the work of Mannhardt, Spencer, Ferguson and Tylor in folk-lore, a phase of classical studies which is developing apace, and whose exaggeration, especially among the Cambridge philologists, is the irritation and despair of soberly trained scholarship. Significant light is thus thrown upon the vexed question of Dr. Paul Rée's influence upon Nietzsche. He saw much of Rée in the years following 1874, and Rée was an ardent follower of the English anthropologists, as Richard Meyer has recently emphasized. These lectures dating from the same general period (1875-6) show that Nietzsche was not uninfluenced by Rée's enthusiasm.

It is pleasant to note Nietzsche's own statement (p. 116) of his interpretation of the strange family names Περκοθαρίαι and Μυσχαῖς in the old Lokrian colonial inscription from Naupaktos. This had previously been known only through W. Vischer's report of a personal statement (Rh. Mus., 1871, p. 59). Despite difficulties it remains far the best etymology which has yet been offered, and the long inscription from Physkos recently published by Adolf Wilhelm establishes its

essential correctness. An emendation of a corrupt passage in Diodoros (5, 31, 2), where Σαρωνίδας [more correctly σαρωνιδας] is changed to Σαμνίδας, is well fortified and deserves consideration (p. 30⁶). Almost certainly correct is the restoration of a passage in the commentary of Probus on Vergil's Aen. VI, 31, which is so corrupt that it has been uniformly athetized by the Editors (p. 309²).

One would expect the lectures on Greek philosophy, *Die vorplatonischen Philosophen, Einleitung in das Studium der platonischen Dialoge*, and the fragmentary studies, *διαδοχαί der Philosophen* (1873-4), and *Democritea* (1866-8) to prove the most significant of all. And yet they are somewhat disappointing as considerable portions of the material had either been worked into the substance of Nietzsche's published books, or else had appeared in the tenth volume of the *Werke*, while the manuscript of *Die vorplatonischen Philosophen* was used by Richard Oehler in his elaborate study, *Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker* (1904). A few especially noteworthy passages may, however, not inappropriately be pointed out, even though the thorough student of Nietzsche may already be familiar with one or another of them in a different context.

Nietzsche's mode of approach to the Greek philosophers is illuminated by such a passage as: "Die Griechen haben die Philosophentypen geschaffen: man denke an eine so individuell verschiedene Gesellschaft wie Pythagoras, Heraclit, Parmenides, Democrit, Protagoras, Socrates. Die Erfindsamkeit hierin zeichnet die Griechen vor allen Völkern aus . . . Alle jene Männer sind ganz aus einem Stein gehauen; zwischen ihrem Denken und ihrem Charakter ist strenge Nothwendigkeit; es fehlt jede Convenienz für sie, weil es, wenigstens damals, keine Philosophenstand gab" (128). They were for him charactertypes, not mere exponents of speculative problems. Their very existence justifies philosophy he added later in the margin, and transferred to his unfinished *Philosophenbuch*: "Es rechtfertigt die Philosophie, dass die Griechen sie getrieben haben" (128³); and they serve to characterize the national type: "Die Sanction der sieben Weisen gehört zu den grossen griechischen Charakterzügen: andere Zeiten haben Heilige, die Griechen haben Weise" (*ibid.*). Compare with this the pregnant saying "Es hängt mit den tiefsten Wurzeln eines Menschen und eines Volkes zusammen, ob er philosophirt oder nicht. Es handelt sich darum, ob er einen solchen Ueberschuss an Intellekt hat, dass er ihn nicht mehr für persönliche individuelle Zwecke verwendet, sondern mit ihm zu einem reinen Anschauen kommt" (131). The impressive personalities of the great single-piece philosophers gave them for Nietzsche, who measured men

solely by personal force, their great significance. It is the men themselves whom Nietzsche makes to rise before us in that brilliant series of character sketches, the completed sections of the *Philosophenbuch*; when one can do that he may be justified in smiling at old Zeller—but only then.

For Heraklitos ("in dessen Nähe überhaupt mir wärmer, mir wohler zu Muthe wird, als irgendwo sonst" (XV, 65) he has but words of reverence and wonder. The following beautiful passage is almost prophetically autobiographical: "Was schon aus seinem politische Verhalten hervorgeht, zeigt jeder Zug seines Lebens: die höchste Form des Stolzes, im sicheren Glauben an die von ihm allein erfasste Wahrheit. Er bringt diese Form durch ihre excessive Entwicklung bis zu einem erhabenen Pathos, durch unwillkürliche Identification von sich selbst und der Wahrheit Die Selbstverehrung des Heraklit hat gar nichts Religiöses; er sieht ausser sich nur die Verkehrtheit, den Wahn, den Mangel an Erkenntniss—aber keine Brücke führt zu den anderen Menschen hin, kein übermächtiges Gefühl mitleidiger Regung verbindet sie mit ihm. Von dem Gefühl der Einsamkeit, das ihn durchdrang, kann man sich schwerlich eine Vorstellung machen: vielleicht macht sein Stil dies noch am deutlichsten, den er selbst mit Orakelsprüchen und mit der Sprache der Sibylle vergleicht Denn er, als Grieche, verzichtet auf Helligkeit und künstlerischen Schmuck, einmal aus Menschenverachtung und trotzigem Gefühl seiner Ewigkeit: dann aber redet er in der Verzückung wie die Pythia und die Sibylle, aber Wahrheit. Es ist nämlich nicht der Stolz der logischen Erkenntniss, sondern der intuitiven Erfassung des Wahren. Einen solchen grossartigen, einsamen und verzückten Menschen muss man sich in ein abgelegenes Heiligtum versetzt denken: unter Menschen war er unmöglich, am besten noch konnte er mit Kindern verkehren. Er brauchte die Menschen nicht, auch nicht für seine Erkenntniss: denn alles, was man erfragen kann verachtete er als *ιστορίη*, im Gegensatz zu der aus dem Innern strömenden *σοφία*. Alles Lernen von Anderen war ihm das Zeichen eines Nicht-Weisen: denn der Weise hatte seinen Blick auf den *einen λόγος* in allem geheftet: sein eigenes Philosophiren bezeichnete er als ein Sichselbstsuchen und—erforschern (wie man ein Orakel erforscht)." An elaborate commentary might be written on this passage to point out the parallels to Nietzsche's own life and character. Seldom in the galaxy of the great has nature come so near repeating herself as in the recluse of Ephesus and *der Einsame* of Sils-Maria.

Most important however is the elaborate treatment of Sokrates, Nietzsche's persistent problem, with whom, to the

very last moments of his rational life, he struggled in thought as Luther had wrestled with God in prayer. The lectures show us nothing new, so far as I have observed, by way of criticism of Sokrates' philosophical and ethical standpoint, but they do give us a conception of how the fine courage, persistency and power of the man Sokrates called forth Nietzsche's unstinted admiration. Nowhere is his splendid personal achievement more worthily recognized. It is worth while to quote here a few sentences of this estimate as an offset to the only too well-known invectives strewn throughout the pages of his published works: "Diese drei muss man als die reinsten Typen bezeichnen: Pythagoras, Heraklit, Sokrates, der Weise als religiöser Reformator, der Weise als stolz-einsamer Wahrheitsfinder, der Weise als der ewig und überall Suchende (p. 122) Er ist ein ethischer Autodidakt: ein moralischer Strom geht von ihm aus. Ungeheuere Willenskraft auf eine ethische Reform gerichtet Ein vom Denken beherrschtes Leben Jetzt tritt die Lösung von den moralischen Instinkten ein: helle Erkenntniss soll das einzige Verdienst sein, aber mit der hellen Erkenntniss hat der Mensch auch das Tugend (p. 227) Sein Bestreben war diese Welt zu ordnen: in der Meinung, dass, wenn sie geordnet sei, der Mensch nicht anders könne, als tugendhaft zu leben Die ganze ältere Philosophie gehört noch in die Zeit der ungebrochenen ethischen Instinkte Jetzt bekommen wir eine Forschung nach der rein menschlichen, auf Wissenschaft beruhenden Ethik: sie wird *gesucht*. Bei den Früheren war sie da, als lebendiger Hauch. Diese gesuchte rein menschliche Ethik tritt zunächst in Feindschaft gegen die traditionelle hellenische Sitte der Ethik: die Sitte soll wieder zu einem Erkenntnissakte aufgelöst werden (228) Es bricht also aus Sokrates ein sittlicher Strom heraus: darin ist er prophetisch und priesterlich. Er hat das Gefühl einer Mission (229) Er wollte den Tod. Er hatte die herrlichste Gelegenheit, sein Uebergewicht über menschliche Furcht und Schwachheit zu zeigen und auch die Würde seiner göttlichen Mission. . . . Die Instinkte sind überwunden: die geistige Helligkeit regiert das Leben und wählt den Tod; alle Moralsysteme des Alterthums bemühen sich, die Höhe dieser That zu erreichen oder zu begreifen. Sokrates als Beschwörer der Todesfurcht ist der letzte Typus des Weisen, den wir kennen lernen: der Weise als der Besieger der Instinkte durch σοφία" (pp. 233 f.).

The lectures on the Dialogues of Plato are introduced by the expressive motto "Plato amicus sed —". There was little in Plato which appealed to Nietzsche, and the whole

treatment is unsympathetic. Plato was the first "Mischcharakter", he "verwirft die gesammte antike Kultur und stellt sich Homer gegenüber (p. 252). . . . Die echte Lust am wirklichen, das Vollwerden des Herzens beim Anschauen der Welt ist Plato ganz fremd" (226 f.). And granted his point of view Nietzsche was of course right. If you put your every hope of salvation in the Pre-Socratics, Plato must be abandoned. We ordinary men with the fine sense for differences dulled by indiscriminate reading, and the delicate appreciation of ethical values blunted by the methodical processes of a standardizing philology would read and enjoy Homer and Plato or Aischylos and Lukian, representatives of the most mutually exclusive Weltanschauungen, because we feel nothing deeply and are incapable of wholehearted singleness of purpose. Not so Nietzsche. Like the readiness to eat anything, the desire for universal knowledge had for him something vulgar about it. He thought too consistently, he felt too intensely to be willing to become all things in turn and to be nothing wholly.

Almost amusing is it to observe how Nietzsche labored to destroy the belief in Plato's artistic achievement. That he could have been a great artist and not a great character, according to his understanding thereof, was hard to believe. He tries to show that his art was "Nebentrieb . . . kein herrschender Haupttrieb."—and quotes various unfavorable criticisms from antiquity, discreetly omitting Cicero's words of fairly worshipful praise. Reminiscent possibly of his own misfortunes at Schulpforta is the naïve argument that Plato could not have been an artist and yet have been so devoted to Mathematics (p. 276 f.).

The *διαδοχαί der Philosophen* will hardly prove interesting to any but the specialist, and even to him its worth is problematic. Its main significance, as that of the *Democritea* immediately following, is to evidence the minute and painstaking character of Nietzsche's special studies in these fields. It is a little difficult to understand just why Nietzsche should have been so drawn to Demokritos. Characteristic is the opening sentence "Wir sind Democrit noch viele Todtenopfer schuldig, um nur einigermassen wieder gut zu machen, was die Vergangenheit an ihm verschuldet hat", a thought often in his mind to judge from the frequency of its appearance. He is in fact the only man of science among the Greeks of whom Nietzsche consistently speaks well, although his personal traits have nothing very singular and fascinating about them. Possibly it was because Demokritos was the first openly avowed atheist among the Philosophers, and, undisturbed by praise or blame pursued in quiet dignity a life of fruitful

investigation. Yet more, perhaps, he was a contemporary of Sokrates, and his works rivalled those of Plato, so that Nietzsche felt instinctively bound to exalt him at the expense of the greater fame of these his own especial enemies. The highly elaborated form of the essays from the period of the *Philologischer Verein* at Leipzig shows us the ardent follower of Ritschl, laying stress, like his master, upon the elegant handling of a theme, quite irrespective of its actual value.¹

Herewith a review of merely this volume of Nietzsche's works might properly be brought to a close, but the completion of the great definitive edition which since 1895 has been appearing from the *Archiv* at Weimar inevitably suggests a backward glance over that interpretation of the Greek spirit which this man of genius has given us. Nietzsche as a vogue has had his day. None could more heartily have wished that misfortune to be shortlived than himself. But Nietzsche is a powerful reagent in the chemistry of modern thought, and especially as an interpreter of the Greek spirit has grown to exert an influence which is becoming more profound and widespread every passing year. At first it was no doubt true that elements anticlassical, or at least unclassical in German culture flocked about him; as one critic would have it; "the spirit of the unclassical flamed up in him like a pillar of fire". Injury has beyond question been done in the name of Nietzsche to the tradition of classical education. Yet this is probably only a passing phase; his larger and permanent effect will and now does work for good. Out of the eater has come forth meat. The newer movement to link classical studies once more with human life after the seven lean years of critical historical investigation and classification of learning's dry bones, is to my mind not to be dissociated from the inspiring example of that classicist who *lived* his Greek culture and philosophy, and who wrecked his academic career and finally broke down that amazingly fertile and gifted intellect because he took to heart, sometimes perhaps too much to heart, the splendid heritage of thought and character-types which his professional studies held ever before his eyes. "Nietzsche" says Joel "hat mehr getan als studiert, mehr als bewundert, mehr selbst als nachgestrebt,—er allein hat mit dem Alten gerungen". Or in his own noble words: "Aus dem Erlebten hat man sich das Alterthum erklärt . . . erst Mensch sein, dann wird man erst als Philolog fruchtbar sein . . . Man versuche Alter-

¹ Though minor misprints are fairly common the following are the only really disturbing errors I have noticed: p. 28 read Εὐλείθυια; p. 100 'οῦται; p. 101 Reinigung (?) for Steinigung; p. 286 Euthyphron; p. 298 ἱκανόν; p. 318 διήκουσε.

tümlich zu leben — man kommt sofort hundert Meilen den Alten näher als mit aller Gelehrsamkeit". This is the spirit of Rohde's *Psyche*, of Zielinski's *Die Antike und Wir*, of Crusius' compact but highly stimulating *Wie studiert man klassische Philologie?*—of the volumes in that significant new series *Das Erbe der Alten*, especially of Steiger's *Euripides*, where from the dust of centuries the man Euripides rises once more to move among us. The final justification of all classical studies, and therefore the best hopes of all lovers of Antiquity, are involved in this movement, and to no one man of the past generation does it directly owe so much as to Friedrich Nietzsche. In a sense not quite as he meant it Joel's remark is nevertheless true: "Das Problem der Antike wird heute zum Problem Nietzsche, und das Problem Nietzsche zum Problem der Antike".

For Nietzsche's "Zurück zu den Griechen!" has awakened echoes far outside the ramparts of professional scholarship. One thinks naturally first of that group of young lyricists about Stefan George, with their motto "Hellas ewig unsre Liebe", their hope for the youth of Germany "dass ein Strahl von Hellas auf uns fiel"—the substance of Nietzsche's own early program: "Die Wiedergeburt Griechenlands aus der Erneuerung des deutschen Geistes". They require patient study of the Greek language, the most exact grammatical knowledge, sharply attack the enemies of classical training and criticise with all freedom those representatives of the present trend of classical scholarship who fail to appreciate quite as the Georgianer feel they should the unique merits of Nietzsche's "Tragisches Zeitalter der Griechen". George's own poetry saving its studied obscurity, is shot through with classical form and feeling, the echoes of Theokritos and Vergil sound in his verse, and that extraordinary poem called "Algabal", redolent of the passion and splendor of the decadent empire, —a period which profoundly impressed Nietzsche of the last phase—is called by a competent critic "die einzige antimoralische Dichtung, die die Deutschen haben." Small as this circle is, and few as there yet be who read George's poetry with the spirit and the understanding, in Hugo von Hofmannsthal's *Alkestis*, *Elektra* and other adaptations from Greek tragedy the widest audience has been reached and a ringing note of beauty and of power struck. The old quarrel between Nietzsche and Wilamowitz roused by *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and giving occasion to the *Zukunftsphilologie* and the *Afterphilologie* pamphlets whose echoes are yet sounding in Germany, is carried on by the Georgianer. Hildebrand in a trenchant article *Hellas und Wilamowitz* takes the latter sharply to task for the literary quality of his translations from

the Greek, and rejects that interpretation which treats Greek science as the peer of Greek art, and sets the Alexandrians and the decadence along side of the great mythic and tragic ages of Greek productivity. George and his group will have none of the Greeks when instinct is dead and art has degenerated to mere virtuosity.

Gerhart Hauptmann's *Griechischer Frühling*, the one really significant book he has written for some years past, is a fine example of what this new and Nietzschean feeling may evoke. Read but the wonderful passage about the Acropolis of Athens, the musings before the crags at Delphi on tragedy and worship, or those on nature as he lies stretched out beneath the pines near Daphni. It is all very beautiful and it is all — Nietzsche.

A serious and noteworthy program from the inmost circle of Nietzsche's disciples is *Das Klassische Ideal* (1906, 3rd Ed. 1909) by E. and A. Horneffer. Though opposed to the present philological tendencies in classical studies these authors would have Greek made the great central theme in the whole system of public instruction from the lowest to the highest, in the hope that Hellenic culture values, which they regard as the only genuine European, may displace the ascetic Christian ideals that are to be rejected as Oriental importations obstructing the free development of a radically different racial spirit. Not without a certain symptomatic significance too in this connexion is Ludwig Hatvany's blatant *Die Wissenschaft des nicht Wissenswerten*, which reached a second edition in 1911. With the petulance of a peevish schoolboy he holds up to ridicule and obloquy the modern classical philologists, Wilamowitz above all others, but Diels, and even Zielinski and Usener are not spared in his fury, while on the other side the attempt is made to set up a pseudo-Nietzschean purely aesthetic interpretation of Hellenic culture. The whole diatribe is redolent of an ignorance and superficiality, a grossness of exaggeration and misstatement, against which the admirably exact and conscientious Nietzsche would have been the first to recoil in disgust. Nietzsche is everywhere quoted, paraphrased, parodied and—misunderstood, and with him are linked Burckhardt, Taine and Renan. The undoubted ability of these men to arouse emotions about antiquity the author obviously values more highly than any ascertainable objective truth regarding the same.

Indeed by a certain statistical method one can almost measure the importance which Nietzsche's criticism of Greek culture is accorded in Germany. In Gustav Billeter's singularly industrious compilation *Anschaungen vom Wesen des Griechentums* (1911), among upwards of six hundred authors

cited, the great majority of course being Germans of the 19th century, none is more frequently quoted than Friedrich Nietzsche. His only rival here (as elsewhere) is Wilamowitz; then at an interval come Herder, Burckhardt, Ernst Curtius, etc., and far down the list Goethe and Winckelmann. And this frequency of citation is the more significant because Billeter's own attitude is unsympathetic, and nearly every one of his theses antagonistic to Nietzsche's characteristic positions.

Even outside of Germany, Nietzsche's influence in this field is making itself felt. The latest interpreter of what he calls *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us* (1912), Mr. R. W. Livingstone of Oxford, sets "the most brilliant season of flower" for the Hellenic genius between 600 and 400 B. C., treats the fourth century as one of a uniform decadence which began distinctly in Euripides and Sokrates, and lists Plato as the "great exception", the essential antagonist of all that is specifically Hellenic in civilization. And lest one take these characteristically Nietzschean positions for mere coincidences he expressly calls Nietzsche "the prophet of our age", and closes his introduction with the frank statement that the whole framework of his conception of the Greek genius "is substantially that of Nietzsche: the Greeks have had no acuter critic".

These are noteworthy manifestations of a certain phase in what appears to be a widespread movement. That conception of the Greeks as the embodiment of noble simplicity and quiet grandeur, which Winckelmann originated and Goethe and the Romanticists spread broadcast, gave way, towards the middle of the past century, to a purely historical and passionless portrayal of the course of social and literary development, in which the Greeks themselves, often the mere *corpus vile* of dry-as-dust philology, were apt to be overlooked amid the sweep of evolutionary processes, or buried beneath accumulations of research material. And now we see an effort to recover the Greek personality at almost any cost, and to portray that personality as strong and naïve and sombre, full of untrained instincts and deep mystic longings.

This is not the place to attempt a refutation of the Nietzschean conception. But an observation or so upon its genesis and presuppositions may lay bare the weakness of its essential thesis. Nietzsche experienced, while yet a student at the university, two great disillusionments, one touching the validity of the ascetic Christian ideal, the other touching the adequacy of science to explain existence and to give life a worthy content. Dissatisfied with any interpretation of things in moral or intellectual terms, he felt compelled to justify the Universe (as Heraklitos had done) only for its aesthetic value

("nur als ästhetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertigt" W. I, 45), and to establish as a new principle of conduct life-assertion, the will to power—in *positivo salus*. Against what he regarded as the debasing philistinism of modern science and the ascetic other-worldliness of Christianity, he sought a great artistic civilization whose abiding achievements in this world's culture were imposing enough to serve as counterpoise. This could be none other than the civilization of Hellas; but of what period? Obviously not that of the fourth century and after, for Nietzsche saw only too clearly that in Aristotle and Plato the spirits of science and of transcendental ethics have a perennial fount of being, and that the age of Alexandria and of the Empire, so long as it remained alive and productive at all, was an age of scientific thought and of studied moral self-control—"lauter Menschen des ermüdeten Instinktes" (W. VII, 163) he calls the Greeks of this period, and speaks despairingly of "das präexistente Christentum, die bereits verdüsterte, vermoralisierte . . . alt und krank gewordene Alte Welt" (W. XV, 224). Inevitably therefore he turned to the Tragic Age. Sokrates as "präexistent-christlich" destroyed instinctive ethics and introduced the age of control and self-denial, so he and the great questioner of the Mythic Age, Euripides, must be rejected ("die moderne Seele war schon da" W. XIV, 202). The great age of antiquity, because neither ascetic nor scientific, is for us "eigentlich . . . ein unzeitgemässes Ding" (W. X, 356). Nietzsche was thus, by virtue of his own instinctive antipathies, forced to an exaggerated estimate of the sixth and fifth centuries, and to the complete rejection of the fourth century and all that it produced. No other man, however, is so forced, unless he shares Nietzsche's prejudices. If so, then he is probably proof against argument—did not Nietzsche himself say that whatever required proof was not worth the proving? Instinctive affinities were his motive power, an aesthetic satisfaction his sole criterium of a judgment's value.

Nietzsche's whole conception of the Greek genius is untenable because of all that his theory must refuse to consider—Sokrates and Euripides, Plato and Aristotle, Demosthenes and Isokrates, Skopas, Praxiteles and Lysippos, Menander and Theokritos, the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Neoplatonists, the whole sweep of Graeco-Roman civilization—to call the sum total of achievement represented by these names "decadence" certainly robs the term of its sting.

To be sure, if one must choose between Nietzsche's concentration upon the sixth and fifth centuries, and the opposite exaggeration of the later periods, as exemplified let us say in

Wilamowitz's *Griechische Literatur*, wherein the period subsequent to Aristotle bulks twice as large as all that precedes him, Lykophron receives as much attention as Aischylos, and John Chrysostom occupies more than three times the space given to Aristotle, why then the former is perhaps the lesser evil. But happily no such choice is necessary, for neither is an adequate statement of the case. A finer conception is it, and a truer, because it explains nearly if not quite all the ascertainable facts of Greek history, to regard the Greek spirit as essentially a striving towards κόσμος, order, and σωφροσύνη, self-restraint. This is no mere quietism that comes of timidity, dullness, lethargy, or world-weariness. The Greek temperament was bold to a fault, active beyond all parallel of achievement, with strong passions, a wholly unrivalled luxuriance and elevation of fancy and imagination, and a vehement will to life and to power, but all ordered, clarified, ennobled, harmonized, patterned, even conventionalized if you will, till the original and vital experience of Hellas has become the decorative culture of Rome and of modern Europe. This is the Greek spirit at its best and this, to a greater or less degree, it always was from Homer to the senility of Byzantium. Hellas was "a small white-hot center of spiritual life in a world of effortless barbarism" as Gilbert Murray has recently so well expressed it in his *Rise of the Greek Epic*. Indeed the permanent value of this book is the inspiring portrayal of those processes of purification and of self-restraint which led to the ennoblement of Hellenic life. As Professor Murray says in another connection: "Every Greek community is like a garrison of civilization amid wide hordes of barbarians; a picked body of men, of whom each individual has in some sense to live up to a higher standard than can be expected of the common human animal".

And after all no one has done better justice to this side of the Hellenic character than, in certain moods, Nietzsche himself (for there is hardly any thinker with whom the appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober can be made more often or more effectively), as the following passages loosely strung together from his works will show: "Die Griechen sind gerade bewundernswerth wegen ihres Sinnes für Ordnung, Gliederung, Schönheit, κόσμος; man merkt in dem Talent zu ordnen ihre Verwandtschaft mit den Italikern und deren mathematisch constructiver Phantasie, mit der sie den Himmel, die Erde, die Götter, und sich selbst massregln. Aber auch ihr Ordnungssinn hat ein Masz, er verfällt nicht in das Pedantische und Juristische, wie die der Römer . . . Es ist ihre glänzendste Seite: die Aneignung und Ueberwindung des Fremden . . . jede Art asiatischer Maszlosigkeit und

Ausschweifung trat ihnen grell vor das Auge, in der Gestalt von hochentwickelten Culturen, die bereits fertig waren" (W. XIX, 16 f.). "Ungeheure Kraft der Selbstüberwindung, zum Beispiel im Bürger, in Sokrates, der zu allen Bösen fähig war" (W. X[Kögel], 355). "In allen griechischen Trieben zeigt sich eine bändige Einheit: nennen wir sie den hellenischen Willen . . . Die Kultur eines Volkes offenbart sich in der einheitlichen Bändigung der Triebe dieses Volkes: die Philosophie bändigt den Erkenntnistrieb, die Kunst den Formentrieb und die Ekstasis" (W. X, 124). "Wir lassen uns leicht durch die berühmte griechische Helle, Durchsichtigkeit, Einfachheit und Ordnung, durch das Krystallhaft—Natürliche und zugleich Krystallhaft-Künstliche griechischer Werke verführen zu glauben, das sei alles den Griechen geschenkt; sie hätten, zum Beispiel, gar nicht anders gekonnt als gut schreiben . . . Aber nichts ist voreiliger und unhaltbarer. Die Geschichte der Prosa . . . zeigt ein Arbeiten und Ringen aus dem Dunklen, Überladnen, Geschmacklosen heraus zum Lichte hin, dass man an die Mühsal der Heroen erinnert wird, welche die ersten Wege durch Wald und Sümpfe zu bahnen hatten. Der Dialog der Tragödie ist die eigentliche That der Dramatiker, wegen seiner ungemeinen Helle und Bestimmtheit. . . wie es die That Homers ist, die Griechen von dem asiatischen Pomp und dem dumpfen Wesen befreit und die Helle der Architektur, im Grossen und Einzelnen, errungen zu haben. Es galt auch keineswegs für leicht, Etwas recht rein und leuchtend zu sagen . . . Weil das Zustreben zum Lichte aus einer gleichen eingeborenen Dämmerung griechisch ist, so geht ein Frohlocken durch das Volk beim Hören einer lakonischen Sentenz . . . den Sprüchen der Sieben Weisen . . . Die Schlichtheit, die Geschmeidigkeit, die Nüchternheit sind der Volksanlage angerungen, nicht mitgegeben—die Gefahr eines Rückfalls in's Asiatische schwebte immer über den Griechen, und wirklich kam es von Zeit zu Zeit über sie wie ein dunkler überschwemmender Strom mystischer Regungen, elementarer Wildheit und Finsterniss. Wir sehen sie untertauchen, wir sehen Europa gleichsam weggespült, überflutet—denn Europa war damals sehr klein—, aber immer kommen sie auch wieder an's Licht, gute Schwimmer und Taucher wie sie sind, das Volk des Odysseus" (W. III, 115 ff.).

Nietzsche remains comrade and kindred spirit of the great Pre-Socratics, one-sided and exaggerated, but bold, stimulating, beautiful. Of him and of them one cannot help but think in reading that splendid figure from his earliest work: "Ein Riese ruft dem anderen durch die öden Zwischenräume der Zeiten zu, und ungestört durch mutwilliges, lärmendes Ge-

zwerge, welches unter ihnen wegekriecht, setzt sich das hohe Geistergespräch fort" (W. I, 364).

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PSYCHOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY—Hugo Münsterberg. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913, pp. 321. \$1.50.

"Our aim", says the author, "is to sketch the outlines of a new science which is to intermediate between the modern laboratory psychology and the problems of economics: the psychological experiment is systematically to be placed at the service of commerce and industry. So far we have only scattered beginnings of the new doctrine, only tentative efforts and disconnected attempts which have started, sometimes in economic, and sometimes in psychological, quarters. The time when an exact psychology of business life will be presented as a closed and perfected system lies very far distant. But the earlier the attention of wider circles is directed to its beginnings and to the importance and bearing of its tasks, the quicker and the more sound will be the development of this young science". (p. 3).

The book is divided into three parts: *The Best Possible Man*, *The Best Possible Work*, and *The Best Possible Effect*. Of these three divisions the first takes up practically half the volume and treats more particularly the application of scientific methods to the question of fitness for such pursuits as railway service, ship service, and telephone service. The scientific problem is first of all to ascertain what traits are requisite for success from the standpoint of scientific as distinct from popular psychology; and secondly to devise and apply methods for the study of these traits. From the nature of the case it is frequently impossible or inadvisable to attempt a reproduction of the conditions under which the work is actually carried on, and so the problem for the psychological expert is to discover means by which it will be possible to study the mental traits involved in various occupations, but under conditions which are widely different from those which obtain in practical life. Hence Professor Münsterberg records in detail the laboratory experiments by which the capacities of railway and telephone employees were tested, and discusses the significance of these results when taken as criteria of fitness. By transforming the practical situation to that of the laboratory type it becomes possible to obtain results which are approximately quantifiable, although it must